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Abstract
We propose functional adversarial attacks, a novel class of threat models for craft-
ing adversarial examples to fool machine learning models. Unlike a standard `p-ball
threat model, a functional adversarial threat model allows only a single function to
be used to perturb input features to produce an adversarial example. For example,
a functional adversarial attack applied on colors of an image can change all red
pixels simultaneously to light red. Such global uniform changes in images can be
less perceptible than perturbing pixels of the image individually. For simplicity,
we refer to functional adversarial attacks on image colors as ReColorAdv, which
is the main focus of our experiments. We show that functional threat models can
be combined with existing additive (`p) threat models to generate stronger threat
models that allow both small, individual perturbations and large, uniform changes
to an input. Moreover, we prove that such combinations encompass perturbations
that would not be allowed in either constituent threat model. In practice, ReCol-
orAdv can significantly reduce the accuracy of a ResNet-32 trained on CIFAR-10.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, combining ReColorAdv with other
attacks leads to the strongest existing attack even after adversarial training.
1 Introduction
There is an extensive recent literature on adversarial examples, small perturbations to inputs of
machine learning algorithms that cause the algorithms to report an erroneous output, e.g. the incorrect
label for a classifier. Adversarial examples present serious security challenges for real-world systems
like self-driving cars, since a change in the environment that is not noticeable to a human may cause
unexpected, unwanted, or dangerous behavior. Many methods of generating adversarial examples
(called adversarial attacks) have been proposed [19, 4, 13, 14, 2]. Defenses against such attacks have
also been explored [15, 12, 26].
Most existing attack and defense methods consider a threat model of adversarial attacks where
adversarial examples can differ from normal inputs by a small `p distance. However, using this
threat model that encompasses a simple definition of "small perturbation" misses other types of
perturbations that may also be imperceptible to humans. For instance, small spatial perturbations
have been used to generate adversarial examples [3, 23, 22].
In this paper, we propose a new class of threat models for adversarial attacks, called functional threat
models. Under a functional threat model, adversarial examples can be generated from a regular input
to a classifier by applying a single function to all features of the input:
Additive threat model: (x1, . . . , xn) → (x1 + δ1, . . . , xn + δn)
Functional threat model: (x1, . . . , xn) → (f(x1), . . . , f(xn))
For instance, the perturbation function f(·) could darken every red pixel in an image, or increase
the volume of every timestep in an audio sample. Functional threat models are in some ways
more restrictive because features cannot be perturbed individually. However, the uniformity of the
Preprint. Under review.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
00
00
1v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
9 M
ay
 20
19
Figure 1: A visualization of an additive adversarial attack, a functional adversarial attack, and their
combination. The additive attack perturbs each feature (pixel) separately, whereas the functional
attack applies the same function f(·) to every feature.
perturbation in a functional threat model makes the change less perceptible, allowing for larger
absolute modifications. For example, one could darken or lighten an entire image by quite a bit
without the change becoming noticeable. This stands in contrast to separate changes to each pixel,
which must be smaller to avoid becoming perceptible. We discuss various regularizations that can be
applied to the perturbation function f(·) to ensure that even large changes are imperceptible.
The advantages and disadvantages of additive (`p) and functional threat models complement each
other; additive threat models allow small, individual changes to every feature of an input while
functional threat models allow large, uniform changes. Thus, we combine the threat models (see
figure 1) and show that the combination encompasses more potential perturbations than either one
separately, as we explain in the following theorem which is stated more precisely in section 3.2.
Theorem 1 (informal). Let x be a grayscale image with n ≥ 2 pixels. Consider an additive threat
model that allows changing each pixel by up to a certain amount, and a functional threat model that
allows darkening or lightening the entire image by a greater amount. Then the combination of these
threat models allows potential perturbations that are not allowed in either constituent threat model.
Functional threat models can be used in a variety of domains such as images (e.g. by uniformly
changing image colors), speech/audio (e.g. by changing the "accent" of an audio clip), text (e.g. by
replacing a word in the entire document with its synonym), or fraud analysis (e.g. by uniformly
modifying an actor’s financial activities). Moreover, because functional perturbations are large and
uniform, they may also be easier to use for physical adversarial examples, where the small pixel-level
changes created in additive perturbations could be drowned out by environmental noise.
In this paper, we will focus on one such domain—images—and define ReColorAdv, a functional
adversarial attack on pixel colors (see figure 2). In ReColorAdv, we use a flexibly parameterized
function f to map each pixel color c in the input to a new pixel color f(c) in an adversarial example.
We regularize f(·) both to ensure that no color is perturbed by more than a certain amount, and to
make sure that the mapping is smooth, i.e. similar colors are perturbed in a similar way. We show that
ReColorAdv can use colors defined in the standard red, green, blue (RGB) color space and also in
CIELUV color space, which results in less perceptually different adversarial examples (see figure 4).
We experiment by attacking defended and undefended classifiers with ReColorAdv, by itself and in
combination with other attacks. We find that ReColorAdv is a strong attack, reducing the accuracy of
a ResNet-32 trained on CIFAR-10 to 5.3%. Combinations of ReColorAdv and other attacks are yet
more powerful; one such combination lowers a CIFAR-10 classifier’s accuracy to 8.5%, even after
adversarial training. This is lower than the previous strongest attack of Jordan et al. [9]. We also
demonstrate the fragility of adversarial defenses based on an additive threat model by reducing the
accuracy of a classifier trained with TRADES [26] to 10.1%. Although one might attempt to mitigate
the ReColorAdv attack by converting images to grayscale before classification, which removes color
information, we show that this simply decreases a classifier’s accuracy (both natural and adversarial).
Furthermore, we find that combining ReColorAdv with other attacks improves the strength of the
attack without increasing the perceptual difference, as measured by LPIPS [27], of the generated
adversarial example.
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Figure 2: Four ImageNet adversarial examples generated by ReColorAdv against an Inception-v4
classifier. From left to right in each group: original image, adversarial example, magnified difference.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce a novel class of threat models, functional adversarial threat models, and combine
them with existing threat models. We also describe ways of regularizing functional threat models
to ensure that generated adversarial examples are imperceptible.
• Theoretically, we prove that additive and functional threat models combine to create a threat
model that encompasses more potential perturbations than either threat model alone.
• Experimentally, we show that ReColorAdv, which uses a functional threat model on images, is
a strong adversarial attack against image classifiers. To the best of our knowledge, combining
ReColorAdv with other attacks leads to the strongest existing attack even after adversarial training.
2 Review of Existing Threat Models
In this section, we define the problem of generating an adversarial example and review existing
adversarial threat models and attacks.
Problem Definition Consider a classifier g : Xn → Y from a feature space Xn to a set of
labels Y . Given an input x ∈ Xn, an adversarial example is a slight perturbation x˜ of x such
that g(x˜) 6= g(x); that is, x˜ is given a different label than x by the classifier. Since the aim of
an adversarial example is to be perceptually indistinguishable from a normal input, x˜ is usually
constrained to be close to x by some threat model. Formally, Jordan et al. [9] define a threat model
as a function t : P(Xn) → P(Xn), where P denotes the power set. The function t(·) maps a set
of classifier inputs S to a set of perturbed inputs t(S) that are imperceptibly different. With this
definition, we can formalize the problem of generating an adversarial example from an input:
find x˜ such that g(x˜) 6= g(x) and x˜ ∈ t({x})
Additive Threat Model The most common threat model used when generating adversarial ex-
amples is the additive threat model. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn), where each xi ∈ X is a feature of x.
For instance, xi could correspond to a pixel in an image or the filterbank energies for a timestep in
an audio sample. In an additive threat model, we assume x˜ = (x1 + δ1, . . . , xn + δn); that is, a
value δi is added to each feature of x to generate the adversarial example x˜. Under this threat model,
perceptual similarity is usually enforced by a bound on the norm of δ = (δ1, . . . , δn). Thus, the
additive threat model is defined as
tadd(S) , {(x1 + δ1, . . . , xn + δn) | (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S, ‖δ‖ ≤ } .
Commonly used norms include ‖ · ‖2 (Euclidean distance), which constrains the sum of squares of the
δi, ‖ · ‖0, which constrains the number of features can be changed, and ‖ · ‖∞, which allows changing
each feature by up to a certain amount. Note that all of the δi can be modified individually to generate
a misclassification, as long as the norm constraint is met. Thus, a small  is usually necessary because
otherwise the input could be made incomprehensible by noise.
Most previous work on generating adversarial examples has employed the additive threat model.
This includes gradient-based methods like FGSM [4], DeepFool [13], and Carlini & Wagner [2], and
gradient-free methods like SPSA [21] and the Boundary Attack [1].
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Other Threat Models Some recent work has focused on spatial threat models, which allow for
slight perturbations of the locations of features in an input rather than perturbations of the features
themselves [23, 22, 3]. Others have proposed threat models based on properties of a 3D renderer
[25], modification of an image’s hue and saturation [6], and inverting images [7]. See appendix D for
discussion of non-additive threat models and comparison to our proposed functional threat model.
3 Functional Threat Model
In this section, we define functional threat model and explore its combinations with existing threat
models. Recall that in the additive threat model, each feature of an input can only be perturbed by a
small amount. Because all the features are changed separately, larger changes could make the input
unrecognizable. Our key insight is that larger perturbations to an input should be possible if the
dependencies between features are considered.
Unlike the additive threat model, in the functional threat model the features xi are transformed by a
single function f : X → X , called the perturbation function. That is,
x˜ = f(x) = (f(x1), . . . , f(xn))
Under this threat model, features which have the same value in the input must be mapped to the same
value in the adversarial example. Even large perturbations allowed by a functional threat model may
be imperceptible to human eyes because they preserve dependencies between features (for example,
shape boundaries and shading in images, see figure 1). Note that the features xi which are modified
by the perturbation function f(·) need not be scalars; depending on the application, vector-valued
features may be useful.
3.1 Regularizing Functional Threat Models
In the functional threat model, various regularizations can be used to ensure that the change remains
imperceptible. In general, we can enforce that f ∈ F; F is a family of allowed perturbation functions.
For instance, we may want to bound by some small  the maximum difference between the input and
output of the perturbation function. In that case, we will have:
Fdiff , {f : X → X | ∀xi ∈ X ‖f(xi)− xi‖ ≤ } (1)
Fdiff prevents absolute changes of more than a certain amount. Note that the  bound may be
higher than that of an additive model, since uniform changes are less perceptible. However, this
regularization may not be enough to prevent noticeable changes. Fdiff still includes functions that
map similar (but not identical) features very differently. Therefore, a second constraint could be used
that forces similar features to be perturbed similarly:
Fsmooth , {f | ∀xi, xj ∈ X ‖xi − xj‖ ≤ r ⇒ ‖(f(xi)− xi)− (f(xj)− xj)‖ ≤ smooth} (2)
Fsmooth requires that similar features are perturbed in the same "direction". For instance, if green
pixels in an image are lightened, then yellow-green pixels should be as well.
Depending on the application, these constraints or others may be needed to maintain an imperceptible
change. We may want to choose F to be Fdiff, Fsmooth, Fdiff ∩ Fsmooth, or an entirely different family
of functions. Once we have chosen an F, we can define a corresponding functional threat model as
tfunc(S) , {(f(x1), . . . , f(xn)) | (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S, f ∈ F}
3.2 Combining Threat Models
Jordan et al. [9] argue that combining multiple threat models allows better approximation of the
complete set of adversarial perturbations which are imperceptible. Here, we show that combining
the additive threat model with a simple functional threat model can allow adversarial examples
which are not allowable by either model on its own. The following theorem (proved in appendix A)
demonstrates this on images for a combination of an additive threat model which allows changing
each pixel by a small, bounded amount and a functional threat model which allows darkening or
lightening the entire image by up to a larger amount, both of which are arguably imperceptible
transformations.
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Figure 3: ReColorAdv transforms each pixel in the input image x (left) by the same function f(·)
(center) to produce an adversarial example x˜ (right). The perturbation function f is shown as a vector
field in CIELUV color space.
Theorem 1. Let x be a grayscale image with n ≥ 2 pixels, i.e. x ∈ [0, 1]n = Xn. Let tadd be an
additive threat model where the `∞ distance between input and adversarial example is bounded by
1, i.e. ‖(δ1, . . . , δn)‖∞ ≤ 1. Let tfunc be a functional threat model where f(x) = c x for some
c ∈ [1 − 2, 1 + 2] such that 2 > 1 > 0. Let tcombined = tadd ◦ tfunc. Then the combined threat
model allows adversarial perturbations which are not allowed by either constituent threat model.
Formally, if S ⊆ Xn contains an image x that is not dark, that is ∃xi s.t. xi > 1/2, then
tcombined(S) ) tadd(S) ∪ tfunc(S) or equivalently ∃ x˜ s.t. x˜ ∈ tcombined(S)x˜ /∈ tadd(S) ∪ tfunc(S)
4 ReColorAdv: Functional Adversarial Attacks on Image Colors
In this section, we define ReColorAdv, a novel adversarial attack against image classifiers that
leverages a functional threat model. ReColorAdv generates adversarial examples to fool image
classifiers by uniformly changing colors of an input image. We treat each pixel xi in the input image
x as a point in a 3-dimensional color space C ⊆ [0, 1]3. For instance, C could be the normal RGB
color space. In section 4.1, we discuss our use of alternative color spaces. We leverage a perturbation
function f : C → C to produce the adversarial example. Specifically, each pixel in the output x˜ is
perturbed from the input x by applying f(·) to the color in that pixel:
xi = (ci,1, ci,2, ci,3) ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1]3 → x˜i = (c˜i,1, c˜i,2, c˜i,3) = f(ci,1, ci,2, ci,3)
For the purposes of finding an f(·) that generates a successful adversarial example, we need a
parameterization of the function that allows both flexibility and ease of computation. To accomplish
this, we let G = g1, . . . , gm ⊆ [0, 1]3 be a discrete grid of points (or point lattice) where f is explicitly
defined. That is, we define parameters θ1, . . . , θm and let f(gi) = θi. For points not on the grid, i.e.
xi /∈ G, we define f(xi) using trilinear interpolation. Trilinear interpolation considers the "cube" of
the lattice points gj surrounding the argument xi and linearly interpolates the explicitly defined θj
values at the 8 corners of this cube to calculate f(xi).
Constraints on the perturbation function We enforce two constraints on f(·) to ensure that the
crafted adversarial example is indistinguishable from the original image. These constraints are based
on slight modifications of Fdiff and Fsmooth defined in section 3.1. First, we ensure that no pixel can
be perturbed by more than a certain amount along each dimension in color space:
Fdiff-col , {f : C → C | ∀(c1, c2, c3) ∈ G |ci − c˜i| < i i = 1, 2, 3}
This particular formulation allows us to set different bounds (1, 2, 3) on the maximum perturbation
along each dimension in color space. We also define a constraint based on Fsmooth, but instead of
using a radius parameter r as in (2) we consider the neighbors N (gj) of each lattice point gj in the
grid G:
Fsmooth-col , {f : C → C | ∀gj ∈ X , gk ∈ N (gj) ‖(f(gj)− gj)− (f(gk)− gk)‖2 ≤ smooth}
In the above, ‖ · ‖2 is the `2 (Euclidean) norm in the color space C. We define our set of allowable
perturbation functions as Fcol = Fdiff-col ∩ Fsmooth-col with parameters (1, 2, 3, smooth).
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Figure 4: The color space used affects the adversarial example produced by ReColorAdv. The
original image at center is attacked by ReColorAdv with the CIELUV color space (left) and RGB
color space (right). The RGB color space results in noticeable bright green artifacts in the adversarial
example, while the perceptually accurate CIELUV color space produces a more realistic perturbation.
Optimization To generate an adversarial example with ReColorAdv, we wish to minimize
Ladv(f, x) subject to f ∈ Fcol, where Ladv enforces the goal of generating an adversarial exam-
ple that is misclassified and is defined as the f6 loss from Carlini and Wagner [2]. When solving this
constrained minimization problem, it is easy to constrain f ∈ Fdiff-col by clipping the perturbation
of each color to be within the i bounds. However, it is difficult to enforce f ∈ Fsmooth-col directly.
Thus, we instead solve a Lagrangian relaxation where the smoothness constraint is replaced by an
additional regularization term:
argmin
f∈Fdiff-col
Ladv(f,x) + λLsmooth(f) (∗)
Lsmooth(f) ,
∑
gj∈G
∑
gk∈N (gj)
‖(f(gj)− gj)− (f(gk)− gk)‖2
Our Lsmooth is similar to the loss function used by Xiao et al. [23] to ensure a smooth flow field. We
use the projected gradient descent (PGD) optimization algorithm to solve (∗).
4.1 RGB vs. LUV Color Space
Most image classifiers take as input an array of pixels specified in RGB color space, but the RGB
color space has two disadvantages. The `p distance between points in RGB color space is weakly
correlated with the perceptual difference between the colors they represent. Also, RGB gives no
separation between the luma (brightness) and chroma (hue/colorfulness) of a color.
In contrast, the CIELUV color space separates luma from chroma and places colors such that the
Euclidean distance between them is roughly equivalent to the perceptual difference [18]. CIELUV
presents a color by three components (L,U, V ); L is the luma while U and V together define the
chroma. We run experiments using both RGB and CIELUV color spaces. CIELUV allows us to
regularize the perturbation function f(·) perceptually accurately (see figure 4 and appendix B.1).
5 Experiments
We evaluate ReColorAdv against defended and undefended neural networks on CIFAR-10 [11] and
ImageNet [17]. For CIFAR-10 we evaluate the attack against a ResNet-32 [5] and for ImageNet we
evaluate against an Inception-v4 network [20]. We also consider all combinations of ReColorAdv
with delta attacks, which use an `∞ additive threat model with bound  = 8/255, and the StAdv
attack of Xiao et al. [23] that perturbs images spatially through a flow field. See appendix B for a full
discussion of the hyperparameters and computing infrastructure used in our experiments.
5.1 Adversarial Training
We first experiment by attacking adversarially trained models with ReColorAdv and other attacks. For
each combination of attacks, we adversarially train a ResNet-32 on CIFAR-10 against that particular
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Table 1: Accuracy of adversarially trained models against various combinations of attacks on CIFAR-
10. Columns correspond to attacks and rows correspond to models trained against a particular attack.
C(-RGB) is ReColorAdv using CIELUV (RGB) color space, D is delta attack, and S is StAdv attack.
TRADES is the method of Zhang et al. [26]. For classifiers marked (B&W), the images are converted
to black-and-white before classification.
Attack
Defense ↓ None C-RGB C D S C+S C+D S+D C+S+D
Undefended 92.3 8.3 5.3 0.0 2.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C 89.2 47.4 50.3 5.9 4.6 4.6 1.7 0.5 0.9
D 84.7 77.3 61.9 32.8 18.6 17.2 17.3 4.3 4.2
S 82.7 20.3 15.7 0.8 29.9 10.7 0.2 0.2 0.2
C+S 82.3 47.2 44.6 7.5 26.2 20.2 3.5 2.2 2.0
C+D 84.3 74.7 63.5 35.2 14.0 13.4 22.2 4.5 4.2
S+D 82.0 69.3 53.9 36.5 26.4 21.1 21.7 9.6 8.0
C+S+D 82.3 70.1 56.4 35.5 25.5 21.4 23.4 10.0 8.5
TRADES 84.2 81.6 72.8 53.7 31.2 27.5 39.3 11.1 10.1
Undefended (B&W) 87.9 7.3 6.1 0.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
C (B&W) 85.6 46.7 43.8 5.0 3.5 3.8 1.3 0.4 0.7
Orig. C D C+D C+S+D Orig. C D C+D C+S+D
Figure 5: Adversarial examples generated with combinations of attacks against a CIFAR-10 WideRes-
Net [24] trained using TRADES; the difference from the original is shown below each example.
Combinations of attacks tend to produce less perceptible changes than the attacks do separately.
combination. We attack each of these adversarially trained models with all combinations of attacks.
The results of this experiment are shown in the first part of table 1.
Combination attacks are most powerful As expected, combinations of attacks are the strongest
against defended and undefended classifiers. In particular, the ReColorAdv + StAdv + delta attack
often resulted in the lowest classifier accuracy. The accuracy of only 8.5% after adversarially training
against the ReColorAdv + StAdv + delta attack is the lowest we know of.
Transferability of defenses To some degree, the attacks investigated are orthogonal; that is, a
model trained against a particular attack is less effective against others. StAdv is especially separate
from the other two attacks; models trained against StAdv attacks are still very vulnerable to ReCol-
orAdv and delta attacks. However, the ReColorAdv and delta attacks allow more transferable defenses
between each other. These results are likely due to the fact that both the delta and ReColorAdv attacks
operate on a per-pixel basis, whereas the StAdv attack allows spatial movement of features across
pixels.
Effect of color space The ReColorAdv attack using CIELUV color space is stronger than that
using RGB color space. In addition, the CIELUV color space produces less perceptible perturbations
(see figure 4). This highlights the need for using perceptually accurate models of color when designing
and defending against adversarial examples.
5.2 Other Defenses
TRADES TRADES is a training algorithm for deep neural networks that aims to improve robust-
ness to adversarial examples by optimizing a surrogate loss [26]. The algorithm is designed around
7
Figure 6: The perceptual distortion (LPIPS) and strength (error rate) of combinations of ReColorAdv
and delta attacks with various bounds. The annotated points mark the bounds used in other experi-
ments: C is ReColorAdv, D is a delta attack, and C+D is their combination. Combining the attacks
does not increase perceptable change by much (left), but it greatly increases attack strength (right).
an additive threat model, but we evaluate a TRADES-trained classifier on all combinations of attacks
(see the second part of table 1). This is the best defense method against almost all attacks, despite
having been trained based on just an additive threat model. However, the combined ReColorAdv +
StAdv + delta attack still reduces the accuracy of the classifier to just 10.1%.
Grayscale conversion Since ReColorAdv attacks input images by changing their colors, one
might attempt to mitigate the attack by converting all images to grayscale before classification. This
could reduce the potential perturbations available to ReColorAdv since altering the chroma of a color
would not affect the grayscale image; only changes in luma would. We train models on CIFAR-10
that convert all images to grayscale as a preprocessing step both with and without adversarial training
against ReColorAdv. The results of this experiment (see the third part of table 1) show that conversion
to grayscale is not a viable defense against ReColorAdv. In fact, the natural accuracy and robustness
against almost all attacks decreases when applying grayscale conversion.
5.3 Perceptual Distance
We quantify the perceptual distortion caused by ReColorAdv attacks using the Learned Perceptual
Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS) metric, a distance measure between images based on deep network
activations which has been shown to correlate with human perception [27]. We combine ReColorAdv
and delta attacks and vary the bound of each attack (see figure 6). We find that the attacks can be
combined without much increase, or with even sometimes a decrease, in perceptual difference. As
Jordan et al. [9] find for combinations of StAdv and delta attacks, the lowest perceptual difference at
a particular attack strength is achieved by a combination of ReColorAdv and delta attacks.
6 Conclusion
We have presented functional threat models for adversarial examples, which allow large, uniform
changes to an input. They can be combined with additive threat models to provably increase the
potential perturbations allowed in an adversarial attack. In practice, the ReColorAdv attack, which
leverages a functional threat model against image pixel colors, is a strong adversarial attack on image
classifiers. It can also be combined with other attacks to produce yet more powerful attacks—even
after adversarial training—without a significant increase in perceptual distortion. Besides images,
functional adversarial attacks could be designed for audio, text, and other domains. It will be crucial
to develop defense methods against these attacks, which encompass a more complete threat model of
which potential adversarial examples are imperceptible to humans.
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A Combining the Additive and Functional Threat Models
Here we provide a proof of Theorem 1.
Threat model Let x be a grayscale image with n ≥ 2 pixels, i.e. x ∈ [0, 1]n = Xn. Let tadd be
an additive threat model where the `∞ distance between input and adversarial example is bounded
by 1, i.e. ‖(δ1, . . . , δn)‖∞ ≤ 1. Let tfunc be a functional threat model where f(x) = c x for some
c ∈ [1− 2, 1+ 2] and let 2 > 1 > 0. The additive threat model allows individually changing each
pixel’s value by up to 1; the functional threat model allows darkening or lightening the entire image
by up to a proportion of 2. Both of these are arguably imperceptible perturbations for small enough
1 and 2. We also consider tcombined = tadd ◦ tfunc:
tcombined(S) ,
{
(c x1 + δ1, . . . , c xn + δn)
∣∣∣∣∣ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S|δi| ≤ 1c ∈ [1− 2, 1 + 2]
}
(3)
This combined threat model allows darkening or lightening the image, followed by changing each
pixel value individually by a small amount.
Theorem 1 (restated). Let S ∈ P(Xn) be a set of inputs such that S contains an image that is not
too dark; that is, ∃x ∈ S for which ∃xi s.t. xi > 1/2. Then
tcombined(S) ) tadd(S) ∪ tfunc(S) or equivalently ∃ x˜ s.t. x˜ ∈ tcombined(S)x˜ /∈ tadd(S) ∪ tfunc(S)
Proof. The above two statements are equivalent, so we focus on the formulation on the right. We
calculate x˜ and show that it satisfies the given criteria. Let x ∈ S such that ∃xi s.t. xi > 1/2.
Without loss of generality, assume that in particular x2 > 1/2. Then let
x˜ = ((1− 2) x1 + 1, (1− 2) x2, . . . , (1− 2) xn)
First, we show that x˜ ∈ tcombined(S). Using the definition of tcombined in (3), we set c = 1 − 2,
δ1 = 1, and δ2 = · · · = δn = 0, which generates x˜. These values clearly satisfy the constraints in
(3).
Second, we prove that x˜ /∈ tadd(S) by contradiction. Say that x˜ ∈ tadd(S). Then ∃ δ1, δ2, . . . , δn
such that x˜i = xi + δi and ‖δi‖ ≤ 1. Consider δ2, which must satisfy x˜2 = (1− 2) x2 = x2 + δ2,
or alternatively δ2 = x2 − (1− 2) x2 = 2 x2. However, x2 > 1/2 implies that δ2 > 1, which is
a contradiction since the constraints on tadd specify that |δ2| ≤ 1. Thus, x˜ /∈ tadd(S).
Third, we prove that x˜ /∈ tfunc(S), again by contradiction. Say that x˜ ∈ tfunc(S). Then ∃ c ∈
[1− 2, 1 + 2] such that x˜i = c xi for all i. Considering i = 1, 2, we have the following system of
equations:
x˜1 = cx1 = (1− 2) x1 + 1
x˜2 = cx2 = (1− 2) x2
From the second equation, we have c = 1 − 2. However, using this in the first equation gives
(1− 2) x1 = (1− 2) x1 + 1, which implies 0 = 1. This is a contradiction since 1 > 0, showing
that x˜ /∈ tfunc(S). 
B Experimental Setup
We implement ReColorAdv using the mister_ed library [9] and PyTorch [16]. Adversarial examples
are generated by 100 iterations of PGD using the Adam optimizer [10] with learning rate 0.001.
After all iterations have completed, we choose the result of the iteration with the lowest loss as the
adversarial example.
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When combining attacks, we apply multiple attacks sequentially to the input example and optimize
over the parameters of all attacks simultaneously, similarly to Jordan et al. [9].
In all adversarial training experiments on CIFAR-10, we begin with a trained ResNet32 [8] and then
train it further on batches which are half original training data and half adversarial examples. We
adversarially train with a batch size of 500 for 50 epochs. We preprocess images after adversarial
perturbation, but before classification, by standardizing them based on the mean and standard
deviation of each channel for all images in the dataset. The CIFAR-10 dataset can be obtained from
https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html.
In CIELUV color space (see section 4.1), we define
(c1, c2, c3) =
(
L
100
,
U + 100
200
,
V + 100
200
)
(4)
so that (c1, c2, c3) ∈ [0, 1]3.
For the experiments described in section 5.3, we use LPIPS v0.1 with AlexNet.
B.1 Regularization Parameters
The objective function and constraints described in section 4 include a number of constants that can
be used to regularize the outputs of the ReColorAdv attack. Changing these constants alters the
strength of the attack and the perceptual similarity of a generated adversarial example to the input.
First, 1, 2, and 3 control the maximum amount by which a color in x can be changed to produce
x˜. For RGB color space, we set 1 = 2 = 3 = 0.1; that is, each channel of a color can change by
up to ∼ 25/255. This is greater than the usual  = 8/255 allowed for adversarial examples, but we
find that the uniform perturbation used by the functional threat model allows each pixel to change
by a greater amount while remaining almost indistinguishable. For the CIELUV color space, we let
1 = 2 = 3 = 0.06. This corresponds to a maximum change of 6 in L and a maximum change of 3
in U and V , since we find that changes in luma are usually less noticeable than changes in chroma.
The i values for RGB and CIELUV color spaces result in similar total amounts of perturbation, but
the CIELUV color space allows the perturbation to be greater in areas where it is less noticeable.
Second, we can control the resolution of the grid G over which the perturbation function f(·) is
parameterized. Let R1 × R2 × R3 be the resolution of G. Lowering the resolution in a particular
dimension acts as a regularizer because it allows less variation in how colors are transformed along
that dimension. For RGB color space, we use R1 = R2 = R3 = 25. However, for CIELUV color
space, we use R1 = 16 and R2 = R3 = 32. With a high R1 value, we find that the attack sometimes
recolors different values of a particular hue very differently. For instance, the attack might make the
light parts of a white car green and the dark parts purple. Lowering R1 forces the attack to alter these
colors more similarly.
Finally, λ controls the importance of the smoothness optimization term Lsmooth. We always set
λ = 0.05.
C Learning Rate Experiments
We consistently use Adam with a learning rate of 0.001 throughout the main paper to craft adversarial
examples. However, we also experimented with a learning rate of 0.01. The results of these
experiments are shown below similarly to table 1. All numbers reported are accuracy over the
CIFAR-10 test set. Each column corresponds to an attack and each row corresponds to a model
trained against a particular attack. C(-RGB) is ReColorAdv using CIELUV (RGB) color space, D
is delta attack, and S is StAdv attack. TRADES is the method of Zhang et al. [26]. For classifiers
marked (B&W), the images are converted to black-and-white before classification. The learning rate
used in an attack is marked above that attack or to the right when the attack is used in adversarial
training. There are a couple interesting conclusions that can be drawn from this experiment:
• The higher learning rate (0.01) is stronger against TRADES and undefended networks. A
ReColorAdv + StAdv + delta (C+S+D) attack with learning rate 0.01 against a TRADES-
trained classifier reduces its accuracy to just 6.0%, compared with 10.1% at learning rate
0.001.
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• Adversarial training against an attack at the higher learning rate (0.01) increases robustness
against that attack but lowers it against other attacks. For instance, consider the network
defended against C+S+D with learning rate 0.01. This network achieves 15.0% accuracy
against attacks of the same type, but the accuracy decreases to 7.1% against some other
attacks. In contrast, adversarial training against attacks at the lower learning rate (0.001)
leads to more robustness across different attacks.
Attack (learning rate = 0.01)
Defense LR None C-RGB C D S C+S C+D S+D C+S+D
Undefended 92.3 5.1 3.8 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
C 0.01 87.8 37.4 45.5 4.7 3.2 2.9 1.2 0.2 0.4
D 0.01 88.8 40.4 22.7 32.7 4.2 4.3 15.0 5.0 4.0
S 0.01 89.3 11.5 9.8 0.3 29.0 9.5 0.4 0.4 0.3
C+S 0.01 90.5 27.0 24.3 2.8 31.4 23.0 2.1 2.8 2.1
C+D 0.01 88.3 46.3 32.7 34.4 6.0 5.4 22.6 4.7 4.8
S+D 0.01 88.0 25.3 17.4 28.4 9.3 8.1 22.6 17.0 13.9
C+S+D 0.01 89.0 32.3 23.8 29.8 13.4 11.4 26.1 17.4 15.0
C 0.001 89.2 37.2 46.6 5.1 3.4 3.0 1.1 0.3 0.3
D 0.001 84.7 72.9 57.4 30.8 12.2 11.2 12.6 2.4 1.8
S 0.001 82.7 14.9 11.9 0.5 22.2 6.7 0.1 0.2 0.1
C+S 0.001 82.3 37.5 40.4 5.9 18.5 13.1 1.9 0.9 0.8
C+D 0.001 84.3 70.8 60.0 33.8 9.4 8.7 18.1 1.8 1.9
S+D 0.001 82.0 65.2 49.9 35.0 18.5 14.0 16.5 5.5 4.5
C+S+D 0.001 82.3 65.8 53.0 34.8 16.8 14.7 18.3 5.1 5.0
TRADES 84.2 79.7 69.2 53.5 21.0 17.8 33.8 6.6 6.0
Undefended (B&W) 87.9 4.7 4.8 0.0 1.6 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0
C (B&W) 0.01 84.7 40.4 41.7 4.5 2.4 2.4 1.0 0.2 0.3
C (B&W) 0.001 85.6 37.8 40.7 4.0 2.5 2.5 0.7 0.3 0.3
Attack (learning rate = 0.001)
Defense LR None C-RGB C D S C+S C+D S+D C+S+D
Undefended 92.3 8.3 5.3 0.0 2.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C 0.01 87.8 46.2 48.4 5.9 4.5 4.4 1.6 0.3 0.7
D 0.01 88.8 43.7 25.4 26.4 4.1 3.8 15.7 8.3 7.9
S 0.01 89.3 18.7 13.9 0.4 13.8 8.4 0.8 0.6 0.9
C+S 0.01 90.5 39.1 32.3 4.3 22.7 17.5 2.8 3.5 3.3
C+D 0.01 88.3 49.1 35.6 29.2 5.3 5.4 20.3 8.7 8.3
S+D 0.01 88.0 25.8 17.7 10.7 4.5 4.1 9.3 6.1 5.9
C+S+D 0.01 89.0 33.9 24.9 15.7 7.5 7.1 13.0 8.4 8.5
C 0.001 89.2 47.4 50.3 5.9 4.6 4.6 1.7 0.5 0.9
D 0.001 84.7 77.3 61.9 32.8 18.6 17.2 17.3 4.3 4.2
S 0.001 82.7 20.3 15.7 0.8 29.9 10.7 0.2 0.2 0.2
C+S 0.001 82.3 47.2 44.6 7.5 26.2 20.2 3.5 2.2 2.0
C+D 0.001 84.3 74.7 63.5 35.2 14.0 13.4 22.2 4.5 4.2
S+D 0.001 82.0 69.3 53.9 36.5 26.4 21.1 21.7 9.6 8.0
C+S+D 0.001 82.3 70.1 56.4 35.5 25.5 21.4 23.4 10.0 8.5
TRADES 84.2 81.6 72.8 53.7 31.2 27.5 39.3 11.1 10.1
Undefended (B&W) 87.9 7.3 6.1 0.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
C (B&W) 0.01 84.7 49.3 44.9 5.4 4.1 3.8 1.6 0.5 0.7
C (B&W) 0.001 85.6 46.7 43.8 5.0 3.5 3.8 1.3 0.4 0.7
13
D Non-Additive Threat Models
Here, we discuss some other non-additive adversarial threat models that have been explored in the
literature and how our work differs from them.
Spatial Threat Models Some recent work has focused on spatial threat models, which allow for
slight perturbations of the locations of features in an input rather than perturbations of the features
themselves. Xiao et al. [23] propose StAdv, which optimizes the parameters of a smooth flow field
that moves each pixel of an input image by a small, bounded distance to generate an example that
fools the classifier. Wong et al. [22] bound the Wasserstein distance between the original input and
the adversarial example. Engstrom et al. [3] apply an small rotation and translation to an input image
to generate a misclassification.
Other Threat Models A few papers have focused on threat models that are neither additive or
spatial. Zeng et al. [25] perturb the properties of a 3D renderer to render an image of an object which
is unrecognizable to a classifier or other machine learning algorithm. Hosseini and Poovendran [6]
propose "Semantic Adversarial Examples," which allow modifications of the input image’s hue and
saturation. Hosseini et al. [7] also explore inverting images to cause misclassification. These latter
two papers can be considered as special examples of functional threat models. In the first, each
pixel’s hue and saturation is shifted by the same amount; that is, each pixel is transformed by the
function f(h, s, v) = (h+ δh, s+ δs, v). In the second, each pixel is inverted, i.e. each pixel channel
is transformed by the function f(xi) = 1 − xi. However, the authors do not propose a general
framework for these types of attacks, as we do. Furthermore, the adversarial examples generated
by these attacks are often not realistic and not imperceptible. For example, their crafted adversarial
examples include green skies, purple fields of grass, and inverted street signs—unlike our proposed
ReColorAdv attack, which results in imperceptible changes.
E Additional Images
Figure 7: More adversarial examples like those in figure 2, generated by ReColorAdv against an
Inception-v4 classifier on ImageNet. Top row: original images; middle row: adversarial examples;
bottom row: magnified difference.
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D
C+D
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Figure 8: More adversarial examples like those in figure 5, generated with combinations of attacks
against a CIFAR-10 WideResNet trained using TRADES. C is ReColorAdv, D is delta attack, and
S is StAdv attack [23]. The difference from the original is shown to the right of each example.
Combinations of attacks tend to produce less perceptible changes than the attacks do separately.
F Lipschitz Regularization
In addition to the regularizations defined in section 3.1, we can also enforce that the perturbation
function f(·) in a functional threat model is Lipschitz for some suitably small κ:
Flips , {f : X → X | ∀x1, x2 ∈ X ‖f(x1)− f(x2)‖ ≤ κ‖x1 − x2‖} (5)
Flips requires some smoothness in the perturbation function f(·), ensuring that similar features in the
input are mapped to similar features in the adversarial example. However, one disadvantage of Flips
is that it includes constant functions f(x) = c, i.e. functions which map every feature to a single
value, removing salient features from the input. Thus, we ultimately use Fsmooth instead.
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